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ABSTRACT
Privacy is always one of the primary concerns in electronic
commerce. Consumers must have the right to keep their
buying habits and personal information confidential,
especially when it comes to on-line credit card payment. Not
just only because this payment method has been becoming
the trend of modern consuming practice, but also it involves
the sensitivity of privacy information. Based on the
need-to-know principle, transaction information should be
distributed properly among participants to be against
aggregation and analysis. In this paper, the privacy
required for on-line credit card payment is described, and
the privacy protection on three common payment protocols
such as SSL, SET and 3D SET are also analyzed in detail.
Two solutions are then proposed to enhance privacy
protection for cardholders.
Keywords : electronic commerce, privacy, credit card,
payment

INTRODUCTION
Privacy has been a critical concern long there before the
advent of computers. As computer technologies advance
and the popularity of Internet grows, personal information
could be recorded, collected, gathered, and analyzed easier
than ever. Privacy protection is therefore becoming an
important issue in the cyber era. In a fraud research led by
CyberSource [1], consumers’ fraud concerns negatively
impact their on-line shopping demand. The loss of
customer goodwill is ranked as the major negative impact for
on-line merchant sales.
According to the American
National Consumers League survey conducted by Opinion
Research Corporation International [2], most consumers
prefer to pay on-line orders with credit cards (67%), while
the greatest concern was that their credit card numbers
would be stolen if they provided the information on-line
(41%).
Twenty-four percent of the survey respondents
ranked the abuse of their personal information as their
greatest concern on on-line commerce. In another fraud
research by CyberSource for UK [3], total credit card
security and the guarantee of keeping one’s personal
information private in any on-line transaction process, as

well as protection against unauthorized access to customer
information in particular, are shown to be the major concerns
of consumers.
Therefore, building up customers’
confidence in on-line credit card payment weighs great
importance to the development of electronic commerce.
With a growing scale of wide acceptance and a mature
business operation infrastructure, payment by credit card
has been a major payment method in the physical world.
This method has been commonly applied on-line, but still
lack of cardholders’ confidence. In order to help build up
consumers’ confidence in on-line credit card payment for
the booming electronic commerce, privacy protection for
customers is in great need to be enhanced. Taking
advantage of its convenience, SSL has become the most
commonly used protocol for on-line credit card payment
nowadays, but only the confidentiality and the integrity of
information data between cardholders and merchants are
secured. Unscrupulous merchants can steal cardholders’
credit card information that contains the key elements
needed to counterfeit credit cards and/or to initiate
fraudulent transactions. SET [4][5][6], the secure electronic
transaction protocol proposed by VISA International and
MasterCard International, is deemed to be a de facto
standard, but gains little acceptance due to its complication
and high cost.
Additionally, banks can aggregate
cardholders’ transaction data for further analysis [7].
Recently the successor of SET, 3D SET [8], is proposed to
improve the portability and the flexibility for cardholders to
pay on-line. The core protocol of 3D SET is the same as
SET, but all transaction detail and history of the cardholder
are stored at the bank that infringes the right of cardholders
on the matter of privacy protection. Banks have long been
trusted by cardholders; however, negative impacts such as
branch closure programs, poor customer services and
security problems with Internet banking are all undermining
customers’ trust in banks.
In this paper, we first examine the privacy needed by the
on-line credit card payment, and then analyze the privacy
protection on the major protocols.
Based on the
need-to-know principle, two methods are proposed to
improve the privacy protection.
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THE TRANSACTION MODEL OF CREDIT
CARD PAYMENT
In this brick-and-mortar world, there are four roles involved
in the transaction model of credit card payment. The issuer
is a financial institution that issues a credit card to the
cardholder. The acquirer is a financial institution that
processes authentication and payments for the merchant.
When a cardholder intends to buy something at a
merchant’s place and wishes to pay by credit card, the flow
of a transaction is described as follows:
1. The cardholder presents his/her credit card and signs a
purchase order to the merchant.
2. The merchant sends an authorization request to the
issuer via the acquirer.
3. After verifying the status of the credit card, the is suer
sends an authorization response back to the merchant to
assure the merchant of the payment.
4. If the transaction is authorized, the merchant then fulfills
the order (e.g., by giving goods) and gives the
cardholder a copy of the purchase order; or the order is
rejected.
To pay on-line by credit card, the business process
resembles that of mail order or telephone order. Based on
the need-to-know principle, the following requirements
should be considered to enhance privacy protection for
cardholders.
Ÿ Only the cardholder and the issuer know the credit card
number.
Ÿ Only the cardholder and the merchant know the order
information.
Ÿ The issuer should not know which merchant the
cardholder deals with.

PRIVACY PROTECTION ON SECURITY
PROTOCOLS
SSL
Originally developed by Netscape, SSL has been universally
accepted on the World Wide Web for authenticated and
encrypted communication between clients and servers.
The SSL Protocol is designed to provide a private and
reliable channel between two communicating entities. This
protocol has the lowest level SSL Record Protocol for
encapsulation of higher level protocols.
One such
encapsulated protocol, the SSL Handshake Protocol, allows
the server and the client to perform mutual authentication
and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic
keys before the application protocol transmits or receives
information.
One advantage of SSL is that it is
independent of application protocols. The application
designers and users have no need to consider the
implementation details of SSL.
Although SSL has been a widely accepted security protocol,
it is still not the best choice for consumers in the sense of
privacy protection. SSL does establish a perfectly secure
channel between the consumer and the merchant; it cannot,
however, protect the consumer from the merchant’s
malicious aggregation of transaction information and, even

the worse, credit card counterfeits and fraudulent
transactions. Hence, making transactions on-line with
straightforward SSL encryption/decryption does not fully
satisfy the concern upon consumer privacy protection.
Client

Server
Client_hello
Server_hello
Certificate*

Establish security capabilities,
including protocol version, session
ID, cipher suite, compression
method, and random numbers .

Server_key_exchange*
Certificate_request*
Server_hello_done
Certificate*
Client_key_exchange

Client sends certificate if requested.

Certificate_verify*
Change_cipher_spec
Finished
Change_cipher_spec
Finished

Change cipher suite and finish
handshake protocol.

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent

Figure 1. Handshake protocol of SSL
SET
SET, jointly developed by VISA, MasterCard, IBM, GTE,
Microsoft, Netscape, etc., is a security paradigm for on-line
credit card payment.
A payment gateway, a device
operated by an acquirer or a third party that processes
merchant payment messages, is defined in SET
specification. We do not distinguish between the payment
gateway and the acquirer here. SET uses public key
encryption/decryption to provide the confidentiality of
payment information and to ensure payment integrity. It
uses digital signatures to authenticate all parties involved in
the payment process, including the cardholder, the
merchant, and the acquirer to ensure entity legitimacy prior
to the transaction. To protect the cardholder’s privacy, the
payment information including the credit card number is
protected from the merchant. If a cardholder intends to
initiate an on-line payment after picking items to be
purchased from the merchant’s web site or electronic
catalogs, the following main steps are taken:
1. The cardholder’s electronic wallet generates a purchase
request including the Order Information (OI) and the
Payment Instruction (PI), which are signed by the
cardholder’s private key as a dual signature. OI is for
the merchant; while PI, protected by a digital envelope
encrypted with the acquirer’s public key, is for the
acquirer.
2. After receiving the purchase request from the
cardholder, the merchant generates an authorization
request (AUTH REQ), which includes the amount to be
authorized, and then transmits the request along with PI
to the acquirer.
3. The acquirer examines the validity of the merchant’s
authorization request and the cardholder’s PI by
verifying the signatures and ensures the consistency of
the two messages. The acquirer then sends an
authorization request, including credit card information
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and transaction amount, through a financial network to
the issuer.
4. After ensuring that the credit card is not stolen, revoked
or over its credit limit, the issuer authorizes the
transaction and sends the authorization response to the
merchant via the acquirer.
5. The merchant transmits a purchase response to the
cardholder according to the received authorization
response.

5.Purchase response

Cardholder

Merchant
1.Purchase Request
DSc(OI), ENV A{DSU (PI)}
2.Authorization Request

4.Authorization
Response

ENV A {SM (AUTH REQ)}, ENVA{DSU(PI)}

apply for a certificate on his/her PC. To increase the
convenience for the cardholder, the function of E-wallet is
divided into a centralized “server side wallet” engine
residing at the issuer and a light-weight, easy-to-download
wallet interface on the cardholder’s device. Through the
wallet interface, an authenticated cardholder can access
his/her server side wallet to pay on-line by credit card. Due
to the low computation demand of the client side, either a
PC, a WAP mobile phone, or a digital TV can be used as the
cardholder’s Internet access device. Similarly, through the
merchant server interface, the merchant can be
authenticated and then access his/her server side merchant
server.
Merchants using 3D SET to authenticate
consumers – by accepting payments from bank-issued
server side wallets – will not be liable for fraudulent
transactions.

3.Authorization Request

Acquirer

Issuer
4.Authorization Response

Cardholder

Merchant

Bank Net

Wallet Interface

Merchant Server Interface

C: Cardholder Sx(M): signature on M with X ’s private key
M: Merchant DSx(M): Dual signature on M with X ’s private key
ENV x(M): M is encrypted by a session key which
A: Acquirer
is encrypted with X ’s private key
I: Issuer
Server Side Wallet

Figure 2. The payment authorization using SET
However, the acquirer receives unnecessary access to the
consumer’s payment information while it only needs to get
the authorization response from the issuer. This situation
violates the basic privacy requirement mentioned in the
previous section. The same problem occurs when the
issuer knows which merchant the consumer makes his/her
transaction with; it just needs to verify the consumer’s
digital signature on payment information.
Hwang and Hsueh proposed a revised SET protocol [7]
using the credit card certificate – an anonymous surrogate
for the credit card – to conceal the cardholder’s credit card
number in the electronic marketplace. This revision also
uses transaction IDs to allow the cardholder generates
his/her monthly statement by linking payment details
provided by the issuer and the information stored in E-wallet
to avoid possible data aggregation by the issuer.
3D SET
VISA introduced a three-domain model (3D SET) in August
1999. Visa EU has mandated its member banks to adopt 3D
SET by October 2001. Minimum standards are set, and the
issuer and the acquirer are free to determine security and
authentication schemes for their own cardholders and
merchants respectively. The 3D SET [8] looks at the
activity between the following parties:
Ÿ The merchant and their bank – Acquirer Domain
Ÿ The cardholder and their bank – Issuer Domain
Ÿ The cardholder’s bank and the merchant’s bank –
Interoperability Domain
SET was too complicated and too costly to be successfully
carried out. A Cardholder needs to install E-wallet and to

Issuer

Server side Merchant Server

Interoperability
Domain

Issuer Domain

Acquirer
Acquirer Domain

Figure 3. The 3D SET model
Basically, 3D SET is working on a basis that all banks are
trustworthy.
The transaction information is primarily
recorded and maintained by the issuer and the acquirer.
Hence in comparison to the original SET, 3D SET enhances
the responsibility of banks. If the transaction information
can be protected from any malicious intention of
aggregation by an individual party, the cardholder’s privacy
can be secured even under the assumption that banks are
not always reliable.

OUR PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As none of the three protocols stated above can fully
secure consumer privacy, this paper proposes two revisions
on the original SET protocol.
Solution 1
The major concept in this solution is that PI here is not
verified by the acquirer, but the issuer instead. The PI in a
purchase request is protected by the digital envelope, which
is made by the issuer’s public key. The verifications of the
credit card certificate and the digital signature are now the
duties on the issuer. Once the issuer authenticates the
customer’s signature in PI, equivalently it means the
customer’s agreement to pay for the corresponding
transaction. With this, the issuer will no longer need to
know which merchant the customer is dealing with. Hence
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the merchant ID can be accordingly removed from PI. The
acquirer may link the authorization response and the
authorization request together by transaction IDs to ask for
redemption
Herein the detailed transaction flow, shown in Fig.4, is
described as below:
1. The purchase request transmitted from the cardholder
to the merchant includes PI and OI, which are signed by
the cardholder’s private key as a dual signature. PI is
als o protected by a digital envelope made by the issuer
to prevent the merchant or the acquirer from knowing
the cardholder’s sensitive card information.
2. The merchant first authenticates the cardholder’s
digital signature in OI. If valid, it then generates and
signs the authorization request (AUTH REQ). This
signed information is then sent out to the acquirer
altogether with the PI from the cardholder.
3. The acquirer verifies the validity of the merchant
certificate, and examines the signature signed on AUTH
REQ. The acquirer may request for authorization from
the issuer with the authorization request and PI via the
bank net or the Internet.
4. After receiving, the issuer obtains PI with its private
key and authenticates the cardholder’s signature on PI.
By confirming the consistency of the authorization
request and PI, the issuer notifies the merchant the
authorization decision via the acquirer.
5. The merchant generates a purchase response based on
the received authorization response. The cardholder
may proceed with the transaction with a positive
purchase response.

5.Purchase response

Cardholder

Merchant
1.Purchase Request
DSc (OI), ENV I{DSU (PI)}
2.Authorization Request

4.Authorization
Response

of credit card information and compares the result with the
subject name recorded in the cardholder’s certificate.
In this scenario, the cardholder’s sensitive information is
exposed at the acquirer’s place, and it may possibly cause
unexpected loss from the cardholder’s point of view.
Hence we propose a revision of SET to protect cardholders
from such losses.

Public Key:
Confidential credit
card information are
recorded in this
certificate with two
times of hash
computation.

Issuer

Acquirer

Subject Name: 8098 3865 2834 0032
Expiry Date: Dec.31, 2001
Issuer: ABC Bank
CA’s Signature

Figure 5. An illustration of a SET certificate
We herein suggest that the cardholder’s credit card
information is recorded in the certificate after two times of
hash computation instead of one. If it is H2(credit card
information) stored in the certificate, only H(credit card
information) has to be shown in PI. By verifying the
consistency between the certificate and PI, the acquirer still
can verifies the card information without knowing the
cardholder’s detail in this case. Hence the cardholder’s
detail information is only known to the issuer and the
cardholder. This meets the basic privacy requirement in
the previous section.

ENVA {SM (AUTH REQ)}, ENVI{DSU(PI)}
3.Authorization Request
ENV I{DSU(PI)}

Serial #: 35792639

The authenticity of
this certificate is
guaranteed by the
digital signature
generated using the
CA’s priavate key.

PRIVACY ANALYSIS
SSL

4.Authorization Response

Bank Net
C: Cardholder S x(M): signature on M with X’s private key
M: Merchant DS x(M): Dual signature on M with X’s private key
A: Acquirer ENVx(M): M is encrypted by a session key which
is encrypted with X’s private key
I: Issuer

Figure 4. The proposed revision on SET payment
authorization

SSL encrypts the link between the cardholder and the
merchant to provide confidentiality and integrity of
transmitted card information. It is inadequate because it
protects transaction details only when it is in the
transmission channel; once the information has arrived at
the web site, it will be decrypted to plain text which leaves
no ways to prevent any kind of frauds. Some malicious
merchants may use the cardholder’s credit card information
that provides the key element needed to counterfeit cards
and/or to proceed fraudulent transactions.

Solution 2
SET
In the original SET, sensitive credit card information,
including the card number, the expiry date, etc., are recorded
as a hashed value
rather than plaintext on the
cardholder’s certificate. When the acquirer needs to verify
the cardholder’s signature in PI, it first extracts the credit
card information from PI, and then computes the hash value

SET has the following shortcomings.
1. The issuer has to trust the acquirer’s verification about
the cardholder’s signature on PI. After sending the
authorization response to the merchant via the acquirer,
the issuer guarantees the merchant for the payment.
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Bearing the risk of false payment, the issuer should
validate that whether PI is indeed signed by the
cardholder to commit the payment. However, the
cardholder’s signature is verified by the acquirer
instead. Hence in the original SET, the issuer has to
rely on the trust relationship with the acquirer
completely.
2. The cardholder’s credit card number is revealed to the
acquirer. It is the issuer that decides whether the
payment is approved or not. The acquirer simply
forwards the authorization response received from the
issuer to the merchant. The acquirer does not need to
know the cardholder’s card information to perform its
function.
3. The issuer knows all merchants whom the consumer has
made his/her transactions with.
3D SET
Credit card number can be sealed from the acquirer using
pseudo card number assigned by the issuer. However,
server side wallet resided at the issuer routes purchase
requests from the cardholder, and communicates with other
SET components (merchant, acquirer and CA). It stores
the cardholder’s private key, certificate, account
information, purchase transaction detail and history. The
cardholder’s buying habit can thus be aggregated and
analyzed. Moreover, the acquirer manages server side
merchant server for merchants. Both PI and OI are open to
the acquirer.
Namely, 3D SET reduces the loading of the cardholder and
the merchant, trying to fit in the newly emerged environment
of mobile transactions. The merchant no longer needs to
set up a merchant server to participate in this architecture.
To the contrary, 3D SET increases the loading of banks, and
removes the right of the cardholder and the merchant to
control their individual information. Such scenario is a
negative impact on the issue of privacy protection.
The proposed methods
Our two revisions on SET are discussed respectively as the
followings:
Method 1.
1. The cardholder’s credit card number is concealed from
the acquirer. It is the is suer to decide whether this
transaction is approved. The acquirer only forward
encrypted PI received from the cardholder via merchant
to the issuer for verification and credit card status
checking. After receiving the authorization response
from the issuer, the acquirer returns it back to the
merchant. Because the acquirer cannot decrypt the
encrypted PI, the cardholder’s credit card number is
protected from the acquirer.
2. The issuer keeps non-repudiation evidence by itself for
future dispute solving. Cardholder’s signature on PI
represents cardholder’s authorization on this payment,
it is the only evidence that the issuer needs to hold
against cardholder’s repudiation.

3. The issuer does not know which merchant the
cardholder deal with.
4. The increased efficiency by simplifying the certificate
verification process. On-line payment involves money
transfer.
Strict certificate verification, including
certificate chain setting and CRL check, is needed to
authenticate participants. Many complicated certificate
verifications are needed in a transaction using SET, the
cardholder need to verify the acquirer’s certificate by
traversing the trust chain to the root key to get the
acquirer’s public key for encrypting the digital envelop
of PI.
The acquirer also has to validate the
cardholder’s certificate by traversing the trust chain to
the root key and check revocation status to get the
cardholder’s valid public key for verifying the
cardholder’s signature on PI. Because no existing trust
is built up between the cardholder and the acquirer, the
complex mutual certificate verification must be done
carefully to avoid dispute. In the proposed method,
using the existing trust relationship built between the
cardholder and the issuer, PI is verified by the is suer, not
the acquirer, to simplify the certificate verification and
reduce potential risk.
Method 2.
We suggest that the cardholder’s sensitive information
should be stored in the certificate after two times of hash
computation.
In that case, only hashed credit card
information, H(credit card information), has to be recorded in
PI, and the acquirer may verify the validity of the credit card
without knowing the detail information of the cardholder.
The cardholder’s privacy is thus secured.
Recording twice-hashed credit card information in the
cardholder’s certificate may raise some security concerns.
Due to the characteristics of hash function, the possibility
of collision may increases, which means that different
cardholders may have exactly the same hashed information
recorded on their certificate. This case reduces the
authenticity of cardholders. The serial number of a
cardholder certificate can be concatenated as part of the
input of the second hash computation. This unique
number may effectively reduce the occurrence of collision.
CONCLUSION
Credit card is a popular mean for customers to pay on-line.
However, the privacy protection issue poses a major
concern to most customers.
To encourage the
development of electronic commerce, privacy protection
mechanisms should be improved to build up consumers’
confidence. In this paper, we summarize the requirements
for protecting cardholders’ privacy, analyze the privacy
protection on three common payment protocols, such as
SSL, SET and 3D SET, and propose two methods to enhance
privacy protection in the context of on-line credit card
payment.
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